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PRESIDENT MADISON’S LIVING
CONSTITUTION: FIXATION, LIQUIDATION, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE
JEFFERSONIAN ERA
Saul Cornell*
INTRODUCTION
Originalism is experiencing a classic paradigm crisis.1 In an attempt to
stave off a host of challenges, originalists have adapted and amended their
theory so many times in recent years that it now seems more like a failed
Rube Goldberg mousetrap than a viable constitutional theory.2 Although
some originalists see this process as a sign of the doctrine’s vitality, a more
plausible account would recognize that the theory has collapsed under the
weight of its many contradictions.3 One of the many ironies associated with
originalism’s intellectual failure is that its assumptions about language and
constitutional meaning are closer in spirit to the anti-Federalists who were
defeated in 1788 than the victorious Federalists who actually framed, ratified,
* Paul and Diane Guenther Chair in American History, Fordham University. This Essay was
prepared for the Symposium entitled The Federalist Constitution, hosted by the Fordham Law
Review on October 2, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank the
other Symposium participants for useful suggestions. In particular, the arguments in this
Essay benefited from thoughtful suggestions by Gerald Leonard, Mary Sarah Bilder, Jonathan
Gienapp, Jud Campbell, and Calvin TerBeek. Portions of this Essay are adapted from chapter
four of GERALD LEONARD & SAUL CORNELL, THE PARTISAN REPUBLIC: DEMOCRACY,
EXCLUSION, AND THE FALL OF THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION, 1780S–1830S (2019).
1. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed.
1996). For a discussion of this theory and responses to it, see Alexander Bird, Thomas Kuhn,
in STANFORD ENCYC. OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu
/archives/win2018/entries/thomas-kuhn [https://perma.cc/83L5-3QAX].
2. See generally Peter C. Marzio, Art, Technology and Satire: The Legacy of Rube
Goldberg, 5 LEONARDO 315 (1972).
3. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 247–
67 (2009); Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 749–
55 (2011); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory:
The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1796–99 (1997); Martin S. Flaherty,
Foreword: Historians and the New Originalism: Contextualism, Historicism, and
Constitutional Meaning, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 905, 907–12 (2015); Stephen M. Griffin,
Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1186–91; Jack N. Rakove, Joe the
Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 575 (2011); Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Nonoriginalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 722–24 (2010). For a useful summary of the many
empirical historical problems with originalism, see FRANK CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF
ORIGINALISM 112–15 (2013).
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and dominated politics and the federal courts in the decades after the adoption
of the Constitution.4 Thus, public meaning originalism, the theory that
continues to shape the modern terms of debate, particularly among
conservatives, is a loser’s theory.5 This irony has thus far eluded leading
champions of public meaning originalism, who have remained resolutely
uninterested in engaging seriously with historical criticism of their theory.6
Two of the central tenets of public meaning originalism—the fixation thesis
and the constraint thesis—share little with Federalist constitutionalism and
are in fact much closer in spirit to anti-Federalist constitutional ideas.7 This
irony comes into clear focus if one looks at an important but generally
underappreciated moment in early constitutional history: President James
Madison’s repudiation of his earlier opposition to the Bank of the United
States.8 In this debate, President Madison embraced a theory far closer to
living constitutionalism than to originalism.9

4. For a critique of originalism focused on its failure to grapple with founding-era
assumptions about constitutional meaning, see generally JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND
CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (2018); Saul Cornell,
Constitutional Meaning and Semantic Instability: Federalists and Anti-Federalists on the
Nature of Constitutional Language, 56 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 21 (2016).
5. Most new originalism has been pressed into the cause of right-wing constitutional
theory. See generally Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A
Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1 (2018). Although less common, there are a
few examples of progressive uses of originalism. For a notable example, see Andrew Kent et
al., Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2112 (2019).
6. See Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L.
REV. 1111, 1155 (2015). Solum badly misconstrues both the philosophical foundations of
modern intellectual history and bizarrely claims that the intellectual history critique of
originalism sought to substitute history for constitutional theory. Id. at 1113–15. In fact, this
is almost the mirror image of the intellectual history critique of constitutional theory. The
point of the intellectual history critique of originalism was that claims about historical meaning
must adhere to accepted standards of proof and argumentation employed by legal historians,
not substitute ahistorical meanings rendered by originalist methods. For withering critiques
of Solum’s misreading of the historical critique of his ahistorical method, see, for example,
Saul Cornell, Reading the Constitution, 1787–91: History, Originalism, and Constitutional
Meaning, 37 LAW & HIST. REV. 821 (2019); Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism:
Failures of Originalist Translation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935 (2015); Calvin TerBeek,
Originalism’s Obituary, 2015 UTAH L. REV. ONLAW 29.
7. On fixation and constraint, see generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist
Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269 (2017); Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The
Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015). For a
discussion of the radically different hermeneutic strategies employed by Federalists and antiFederalists, see Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution:
Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate Over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. &
HUMANS. 295 (2011).
8. This episode has started to garner more interest among constitutional scholars. See
generally Robert J. Kaczorowski, Inherent National Sovereignty Constitutionalism: An
Original Understanding of the U.S. Constitution, 101 MINN. L. REV. 699 (2016); David S.
Schwartz, Madison’s Waiver: Can Constitutional Liquidation Be Liquidated?, 72 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 17 (2019).
9. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The
Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243 (2019).
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I. MR. MADISON’S MESS: THE WAR OF 1812, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS,
AND THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL CHANGE
After nearly a decade in opposition during the 1790s, Republicans
celebrated their presidential triumph in the election of 1800 with toasts and
songs about “Jefferson and Liberty.”10 Federalists feared that the new
president was a disciple of Thomas Paine’s radical democratic ideas.11 A
Jeffersonian presidency, they dreaded, would be a political catastrophe that
would undo all their work of the previous decade. President Thomas
Jefferson turned out to be a very different person from Vice President
Jefferson, the leader of the Republican opposition during the John Adams
administration. Rather than mount a full-scale attack on Federalist policy,
Jefferson adopted a less confrontational approach. In his presidential
inaugural address, he struck a conciliatory tone and reminded Americans:
“We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists.”12
Jefferson also promised the nation “a wise and frugal government.”13
Implementing this, however, proved far more difficult than he had hoped.
The opportunity to purchase the Louisiana Territory and double the size of
the new nation led him to cast aside his constitutional theory of strict
construction to achieve his political goal of creating an expanding yeoman
republic.14 By the end of Jefferson’s second term in 1809, some Americans
believed that the president and his Republican allies had become
indistinguishable from their Federalist opponents when it came to using
federal power to further their goals.15 The same would prove true for
Jefferson’s anointed successor, James Madison, who made additional
compromises that left some of his most ardent supporters feeling betrayed.16
Events in Europe posed several challenges to Jefferson and Madison that
neither figure could have anticipated when they led the opposition during the
tempestuous 1790s. In 1803, two weeks after selling Louisiana, France again
found itself at war with Great Britain.17 Although Napoleon’s armies
dominated the European continent, Britain’s navy commanded the seas and
defeated the French fleet at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. American
10. GERALD LEONARD & SAUL CORNELL, THE PARTISAN REPUBLIC: DEMOCRACY,
EXCLUSION, AND THE FALL OF THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION, 1780S–1830S (2019).
11. See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 50,
105 (2005); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
1789–1815, at 177–78, 199–200 (2009).
12. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS 492, 493 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). See also generally JAMES ROGER SHARP,
THE DEADLOCKED ELECTION OF 1800: JEFFERSON, BURR, AND THE UNION IN THE BALANCE
(2010); WILENTZ, supra note 11; WOOD, supra note 11.
13. Jeffry H. Morrison, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson: A “Friendship Which Was
for Life,” in A COMPANION TO JAMES MADISON AND JAMES MONROE 259, 269 (Stuart Leibiger
ed., 2013).
14. JEREMY D. BAILEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND EXECUTIVE POWER 2, 4–5 (2007).
15. Id. at 2.
16. For a sympathetic account of Jefferson’s effort to adapt his political ideals to the
presidency, see id.
17. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 124.
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merchants reaped huge profits from trade with both the French and the British
in the nascent stages of the European conflict.18 Accordingly, the United
States insisted that neutral nations had a right to carry on nonmilitary trade
with both sides in the conflict, but neither Britain nor France honored this
idea. The British navy boarded and searched American ships and seized
cargoes without providing compensation. Even more galling to Americans
was the British practice of impressment—forcing merchant seamen to serve
in the British navy. Many American sailors had once served in the British
navy but now claimed American citizenship.19 Great Britain refused to
recognize these claims, arguing that the men were deserters still subject to
British law. Between 1803 and 1812, the British navy abducted and
impressed 6000 Americans.20
Hoping to avoid war with Britain and France, Jefferson proposed a policy
of “peaceable coercion.”21 The 1807 Embargo Act22 became the cornerstone
of this policy. By keeping America’s ships out of harm’s way and depriving
Britain and France of the economic benefits of American trade, Jeffersonian
policy was designed to force both nations to respect the right of neutral
nations to trade on the high seas.23 The policy was a total failure. Smugglers
flouted the ban, and it proved exceedingly unpopular in New England and
seaport towns.24 American exports fell from $108 million in 1807 to $22
million in 1808.25 To enforce the embargo along the Canadian border,
Jefferson had to send in troops, a decision he had decried during the Whiskey
Rebellion a decade earlier.26
Federalists in New England, whose political fortunes had been flagging,
now regained their voices, rallying against Jefferson and his “Dambargo.”27
Jefferson’s Embargo Act not only divided Republicans but also strengthened
the fortunes of the Federalists in many places, particularly New England,
where the economic impact of the embargo struck hardest.28 The Federalist
presidential candidate in the 1808 election, Charles Pinckney, received three
times as many votes as he had in 1804, doing particularly well in New
England.29 Despite this strong showing, especially in New England and New

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Act of Dec. 22, 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451.
LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 124.
Id. at 124–25.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 125. See generally J. C. A. STAGG, THE WAR OF 1812: CONFLICT FOR A
CONTINENT (2012).
27. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 125.
28. Id.
29. Philip J. Lampi, The Federalist Party Resurgence, 1808–1816: Evidence from the
New Nation Votes Database, 33 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 255, 259 (2013).
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York, Madison defeated Pinckney by 122 to 47 electoral votes to become the
fourth president of the United States in 1809.30
Unfortunately for Madison, he had inherited a major foreign policy crisis
from Jefferson. The embargo had not forced Britain and France to change
their policies. Southern agriculture and New England commerce had
suffered and frustration among Madison’s supporters was growing.31 As
prospects for avoiding armed conflict dwindled, many Republicans were
swept up by a more belligerent attitude: many believed that war was the only
option left.32 Support for this stance was far from universal among
Republicans. Militarism revived old fears and rhetoric, especially among the
“Old Republicans,” who believed that war would precipitate the
establishment of a large military, new taxes, and an increased concentration
of power in the federal government.33
Changes in the structure of politics played a major role in the emergence
of a pro-war strain of Republicanism. The political center of gravity of
Jeffersonian Republicanism had shifted from old colonial centers of power,
such as Virginia to the southwest, to new states like Kentucky and Tennessee.
Congressmen Henry Clay of Kentucky and John C. Calhoun, an up-country
South Carolinian, were the rising stars who spoke for a new breed of
Republican politician.34
In addition to championing a military response to Great Britain’s actions
on the high seas, many Americans viewed the struggle as a way to settle old
scores, including recent Irish immigrants, who had felt the oppressive hand
of British rule firsthand, and frontier settlers who were angered by British
trade with Native Americans, a lucrative commerce that included guns.35
Although the immediate cause of the War of 1812 was British naval policy,
the war had the greatest transformative impact along the western frontier.
For Republican “War Hawks,” expansion into Native American territory, the
annexation of Canada, and possible expansion into Florida were driven by a
nearly insatiable desire for new lands for expropriation and settlement.36
Unfortunately, America was ill prepared to take on the greatest naval
power in the world. Great Britain had created a powerful fiscal-military state
that was far better equipped to wage war.37 By contrast, America’s military
was greatly weakened by Republican demilitarization begun by Jefferson.
30. Aaron N. Coleman, President James Madison’s Domestic Policies, 1809–1817:
Jeffersonian Factionalism and the Beginnings of American Nationalism, in A COMPANION TO
JAMES MADISON AND JAMES MONROE, supra note 13, at 192, 195.
31. See Jasper M. Trautsch, “Mr. Madison’s War” or the Dynamic of Early American
Nationalism?, 10 EARLY AM. STUD. 630, 645–46 (2012).
32. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 129.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 129–30. See also generally J. C. A. STAGG, MR. MADISON’S WAR: POLITICS,
DIPLOMACY, AND WARFARE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1783–1830 (1983).
35. See ALAN TAYLOR, THE CIVIL WAR OF 1812: AMERICAN CITIZENS, BRITISH SUBJECTS,
IRISH REBELS & INDIAN ALLIES 6–9 (2011).
36. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 130.
37. See generally JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY, AND THE ENGLISH
STATE, 1688–1783 (1990).
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Even so, led by Clay and Calhoun, the War Hawks agitated for war. Madison
too finally accepted that Jefferson’s alternative policy of commercial
coercion had failed and war was almost inevitable.38 However, the strong
opposition of the Anglophilic Federalists and the reluctance of some oldschool Republicans to sanction the expansion in federal power necessary to
wage war delayed a declaration until June 1812, when Congress voted for
war 79 to 49 in the House of Representatives and 19 to 13 in the Senate.39
No one factor explains the voting pattern, but by 1812, many Americans had
come to believe that the war was a second chapter in America’s struggle for
independence, a conflict that was absolutely necessary to bring Britain to
heel, break British domination of international trade, and cut off British
support for hostile Native American populations along the frontier.40
In New England, popular resistance to Republican power bubbled up from
below, even as elites formulated a more formal set of responses to a
potentially disastrous war.41 Across Massachusetts, state legislatures
received petitions from towns requesting that their state government
“interpose,” effectively creating a shield that could protect the liberties of
citizens from the tyranny of the central government. The current threat now
came from Republicans, not from Federalists.42 These “memorials”
requested a convention of the “northern and commercial states” to address
the constitutional issues raised by Republican policy.43 Though a number of
these issues had been percolating for a decade, after two years of war, there
was talk of more radical steps, such as secession or direct diplomatic
engagement with the British.44
In response to the petitions, Massachusetts’s legislature and its governor
threw their weight behind a New England states’ convention that would
convene in Hartford, Connecticut.45 However, not all states sent full
delegations, and the Federalists who did travel to Hartford were dominated
by moderate voices, not the firebrands of secession.46 Rather than follow a

38. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 130; see also TAYLOR, supra note 35.
39. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 130.
40. Id.; see also David J. Siemers, President James Madison and Foreign Affairs, 1809–
1817: Years of Principle and Peril, in A COMPANION TO JAMES MADISON AND JAMES MONROE,
supra note 13, at 208, 216.
41. See generally Joshua M. Smith, Murder on Isle Au Haut: Violence and Jefferson’s
Embargo in Coastal Maine, 1807–1809, ME. HIST., Spring 2000, at 17.
42. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 132.
43. Id. (quoting Letter from Joseph Lyman to Several Gentlemen (Jan. 5, 1814), in NOAH
WEBSTER, A COLLECTION OF PAPERS ON POLITICAL, LITERARY, AND MORAL SUBJECTS 312, 314
(New York, Webster & Clark 1843)); see also Thomas Jefferson, A Proclamation (Apr. 19,
1808), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 438, 439 (New
York, Bureau of Nat’l Literature 1897); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Daniel D. Tompkins
(Aug. 15, 1808), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 131, 132 (Albert Ellery Bergh
ed., 1907).
44. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 132. For the standard account, see JAMES M.
BANNER, TO THE HARTFORD CONVENTION: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE ORIGINS OF PARTY
POLITICS IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1789–1815 (1970).
45. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 132.
46. Id.
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radical states’ rights agenda, the Hartford Convention adopted a platform of
more moderate constitutional reforms, including seven proposed
amendments that squarely targeted Republican power.47
The first proposal aimed to weaken Southern influence in Congress by
revoking the three-fifths compromise, a change that would cut back
Republican power by depriving them of a significant portion of their southern
electoral base.48 The second proposed amendment attacked the Louisiana
Purchase and its support for the spread of slavery. Rather than a simple
majority, to admit new states, future acquisitions of land would require a
supermajority.49 The Federalists sought to constitutionalize their criticism of
the embargo, requiring any future embargo lasting longer than sixty days to
attain a similar supermajority.50 Moreover, in a not very subtle rebuke of
Albert Gallatin, a leading Jeffersonian, the Hartford Convention proposed
that naturalized immigrants no longer be permitted to hold civil office or
serve in Congress.51 Presidents would be limited to a single term. Finally, a
proposal aimed to prevent a future “Virginia dynasty” from dominating the
presidency would prohibit presidents from the same state following one
another consecutively.52
This list of proposals was transmitted to the states so they could commence
the formal amendment process.53 Initially, the timing seemed propitious,
coming at the end of a dispiriting, two-year military stalemate that included
the burning of the president’s residence (a humiliation that also included
British troops’ ransacking the mansion and feasting on an elegant dinner that
had been prepared for President Madison and his wife, Dolly).54 Federalists
might have had good reason to think America would be receptive to the
Hartford Convention’s statements of grievances and reforms when they were
formulated.55 However, by the time the proposals were published, a peace
treaty ending the war had been signed in Ghent, Belgium.56 Even more
disastrous for the hopes of a Federalist revival, though, was the news of a
stunning victory by Andrew Jackson and his troops at the Battle of New
Orleans on January 8, 1815.57 Although the Treaty of Ghent had already
been signed, Jackson’s impressive victory over the British was a cause for
national celebration.58 Indeed, Jackson would ride “The Glorious 8th of
January” to a political career that symbolized, if it did not embody, the
triumph of a racialized vision of democratic constitutionalism over the
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also Alison L. LaCroix, A Singular and Awkward War: The Transatlantic
Context of the Hartford Convention, 6 AM. NINETEENTH CENTURY HIST. 3, 22 (2005).
49. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 132.
50. Id. at 132–33.
51. Id. at 133.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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Federalists’ hierarchical, but in some respects more inclusive, form of
constitutionalism.59 The vision of the Hartford Convention and the New
England Federalists were dashed, at least as a force in national politics.60
The War of 1812 forced a major realignment in American politics. The
war marked the end of Federalist hope for political revival at the national
level. Federalists, particularly in New England, suffered significant setbacks
because of their anti-war stance and anti-nationalism. Still, there were some
notable local successes by Federalists that revealed the remarkable resiliency
of their ideology in many parts of the nation. Federalist newspaper editors
and local politicians continued to challenge the Madison administration,
despite the weakness of their party’s efforts on the national scene.61
Even more troubling to Madison’s agenda was the fracturing of his
Republican coalition. The Old Republican animus toward Madison
persisted, but the War of 1812 spurred younger Republicans to drift in a neoFederalist direction, especially on matters of political economy and military
policy.62 Rejecting Alexander Hamilton’s vision of a powerful fiscal
military state modeled on Great Britain was one thing, but the War Hawks
recognized that it was vital to create a Republican alternative.63 Traditional
Republican hostility to institutions like a standing army, a national bank, and
a national system of internal improvements had hampered the war effort and
left the nation vulnerable. Dogmatic adherence to strict construction and
skepticism of federal power gave way to a more pragmatic view of the
Constitution for politicians such as Clay and Calhoun.64
Although at first glance it might seem that the pressures of war led
Federalists and Republicans to reverse roles on questions of federal power,
this claim obscures far more than it illuminates. The postures Republicans
and Federalists adopted in response to the challenges of the War of 1812 were
predictable given the structures created by the federal system.65 The defenses
of states’ rights were never exclusively the province of Republicans any more
than defenses of federal power were the exclusive preserve of Federalists.66
In 1788, the most nationalist-minded Federalists were forced to adapt their
arguments to anti-Federalist critiques, acknowledging a limited commitment
to states’ rights, at least within the sphere of powers clearly reserved to the
states by the Constitution.67 Madison was no exception to this process of

59. Id.
60. See Lampi, supra note 29, at 275.
61. See generally Andrew W. Robertson, Afterword, Reconceptualizing Jeffersonian
Democracy, 33 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 317 (2013).
62. See LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 129–33.
63. Id.
64. For an important collection of essays reevaluating the Jeffersonian period, see
JEFFERSONIANS IN POWER: THE RHETORIC OF OPPOSITION MEETS THE REALITIES OF
GOVERNING (Joanne B. Freeman & Johann N. Neem eds., 2019).
65. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 134.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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accommodation and adaptation.68 One of the most dramatic examples of
how Madison’s thought evolved during the debate over ratification may be
found in his engagement with anti-Federalist critiques of consolidation and
the structural safeguards created by the Constitution to limit potential federal
tyranny. Federalist No. 46 contemplated the unthinkable: a nightmare
scenario in which the individual states might need to call on their militias to
protect themselves from federal overreach.69 It is unlikely Madison would
have felt compelled to lay out this doomsday option at the outset of
ratification were it not for persistent anti-Federalist attacks. To fend off the
exaggerated rhetoric and attacks of anti-Federalists, Madison was led to offer
concrete assurances that the new federal government would never bring
about the dreaded “consolidation” that so many anti-Federalists warned was
inevitable.70
Madison’s frank recognition of the reality that the state militias might
serve as the ultimate check on federal power, something that is difficult to
comprehend in our modern post–Civil War vision of federalism, is a useful
reminder of the historical chasm that separates modern constitutional law
from the founding era.71
Making sense of Madison’s evolving constitutional thought has posed a
host of interpretive problems for scholars.72 In comparison to Hamilton’s
radical nationalist and statist notions, Madison’s federalism was
conceptualized in dynamic, not static terms.73 Achieving the correct balance
between the centripetal and centrifugal forces in American politics at any
particular moment in time required adjustments and accommodations of the
facts on the ground as well as the actions of multiple constitutional actors.74
More importantly, throughout his public life, Madison wrestled with the
more fundamental question: how to preserve his constitutional ideals in the
face of the crises and challenges posed by changing circumstances. Modern
scholars have spilled a good deal of ink debating the so-called “Madison
Problem”—the degree to which Madison’s constitutional ideas and
commitments shifted over time.75 One possible solution to this conundrum
68. See generally SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE
DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828 (1999).
69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (E. H. Scott ed., Chicago, Scott, Foresman
& Co. 1898).
70. Id.
71. See Gienapp, supra note 6, at 942–43.
72. See generally Alan Gibson, The Madisonian Madison and the Question of
Consistency: The Significance and Challenge of Recent Research, 64 REV. POL. 311 (2002);
David S. Schwartz & John Mikhail, The Other Madison Problem, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2033,
2046 (2021).
73. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 134.
74. Id.
75. See generally MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND:
REVISING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2015); GREG WEINER, MADISON’S METRONOME: THE
CONSTITUTION, MAJORITY RULE, AND THE TEMPO OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2012); GORDON S.
WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE FOUNDERS DIFFERENT (2006); Peter
S. Onuf, The “Madison Problem” Revisited, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 515 (2010). The most
dramatic illustration of this aspect of Madison’s thought was his shifting views of the meaning
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is to recognize that Madison had always accepted that the realities of
constitutional politics would often force periodic reconsiderations of his
constitutional theory. In short, Madison’s vision of constitutional laws was
always attuned to the necessity of change in response to new challenges. In
modern constitutional law, it is common to think of law limiting and framing
politics. In the founding era, the reverse was true. Politics set the parameters
of constitutional change.76
The War of 1812 tested Madison’s constitutional views and commitments
on many issues that had divided Americans since 1788. The problem of
wartime finance forced him to revisit his earlier opposition to Hamilton’s
bank. The first bank debate pit Hamilton against Jefferson and Madison.77
Much had changed in the years since that conflict divided Americans, but the
antibank rhetoric of the 1790s was a powerful language readily available to
those who wished to oppose it.78 Although many of the same ideological
issues were put in play, the dynamics of constitutional politics were radically
different during Madison’s presidency.79 Since its incorporation, the bank
had blossomed and largely escaped political controversy.80 Once viewed as
an institution closely aligned with eastern financial interests and a source of
the corruption inimical to the survival of republican government, the bank
now enjoyed broader support. It had developed ties with economic interests
in multiple regions of the nation, including links to the south and west.81 The
bank was no longer seen as a creature of a small regional cabal of economic
elites but rather, it could claim to be central to multiple sectors of the growing
American economy.82 To further diffuse criticism that the bank would
become an agent of consolidation and undermine the states, the individual
branches enjoyed a good deal of autonomy. Rather than pursuing a
monolithic set of fiscal goals driven by a distant national elite, the bank was
able to forge stronger ties with regional and local economic elites whose own
economic fortunes were now tied to the prosperity of an institution they once
viewed with suspicion.83
Considering its importance to the American economy, rechartering the
bank should have been an uncomplicated affair.84 But despite its newfound
support, the ghost of Hamilton continued to hover over the debate, making it
of the Tenth Amendment, particularly his original opposition to including the word
“expressly” and his later reinterpretation of the Tenth Amendment as if the word expressly
had been included in the text. See GIENAPP, supra note 4, at 195–96.
76. This crisp conceptualization is developed by Rachel A. Shelden, Contesting the
Constitution: Constitutional Politics, Then and Now, 48 REVS. IN AM. HIST. 515, 519 (2020).
77. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 134.
78. See generally MARK R. KILLENBECK, M’CULLOCH V. MARYLAND: SECURING A NATION
(2006) (summarizing the events that led to the rise of the second bank and the debates
surrounding its establishment).
79. See LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 134.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 135.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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an easy target for Old Republicans who believed that the dangers of the bank
were not offset by its economic benefits.85 Moreover, nothing in the ensuing
years had changed the view of many that the power to create such an
institution was simply not among those delegated to the federal government
by the Constitution.86 Finally, some simply attacked the bank for reasons of
political advantage.87
II. MADISONIAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND “JUST CONSTRUCTION”:
AN INFERENTIALIST MODEL
Beginning with his earliest writings, Madison proved to be a pragmatic
and adaptable constitutional theorist. Over the course of ratification and after
his election to Congress, he was forced to address a variety of novel
constitutional questions. The touchstones of his theory were not fixation and
constraint, the twin poles of much modern originalism but rather, flexibility
and change.
When the issue of the president’s removal power was debated shortly after
ratification, members of the First Congress were deeply divided over how to
interpret the text of the Constitution. Representative Elbridge Gerry
articulated a distinctly anti-Federalist point of view, arguing that “all
construction of the meaning of the constitution is dangerous or unnatural, and
therefore ought to be avoided.”88 Madison and several others rejected
Gerry’s strong textualism in favor of an argument that rested on the “nature
of things.”89 Unfortunately, there was considerable disagreement over what
the nature of things was in this instance. Different interpretive theories and
different textual sources were pressed into battle by the participants in the
debate. Some invoked the intent of the Philadelphia Convention, but others,
most notably Madison, referenced the intentions of the state ratification
conventions, and some appealed to the criticism of anti-Federalist essayists
or the exegesis of the executive in arguments developed in the various essays
of The Federalist.90
During the debate over the Bank of the United States, Gerry and Madison
found themselves opposing one another again. This debate offered more
opportunities to flesh out issues of constitutional interpretation. The
language of the Constitution, Gerry argued, had to be interpreted using the
traditional tools of statutory construction, and he turned to William

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Jonathan Gienapp, Making Constitutional Meaning: The Removal Debate and the
Birth of Constitutional Essentialism, 35 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 375, 405–06 (2015) (quoting 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 596 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Elbridge Gerry)).
89. Id. at 381, 410.
90. Id. at 403–08; see also CORNELL, supra note 68, at 187–94. Although modern
convention often refers to “The Federalist Papers,” members of the founding generation did
not use this term. The correct historical usage should refer to the original edition THE
FEDERALIST: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS (New York, J & A. McLean 1788).
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Blackstone as the recognized authority for discerning those rules.91 Madison
rejected Gerry’s analysis, noting that the U.S. Constitution was a different
type of legal instrument that demanded a novel approach. Madison argued
that the intentions of the state ratification conventions, not the Framers, were
dispositive of the Constitution’s legal meaning.92 The disagreement between
Madison and Gerry underscored a point that had become obvious during the
debate over the removal power: there was no universally accepted method
of interpreting the new Constitution.93 Indeed, there was no consensus on
what sort of legal document the Constitution was or which modes of legal
analysis were best suited to glean its meaning.94
Some modern originalists have chosen to use modern philosophy of
language and analogize constitutional interpretation in the founding era to an
ordinary conversation between social equals engaged in an open and direct
exchange of information in the contemporary Anglo-American academic
world.95 The “standard communication model” favored by many originalists
rests on a set of anachronistic assumptions about founding-era constitutional
debate. Conversations about constitutional meaning, from the plebeian
world of the tavern to the more formal discourse evident in courts of law,
were typically shaped by strategic and political concerns, not the ordinary
maxims of conversation that modern philosophers of language treat as
universal norms evidenced in all cultures at all times.96 Most forms of
91. See Saul Cornell, The Original Meaning of Original Understanding: A NeoBlackstonian Critique, 67 MD. L. REV. 150, 153–54 (2007).
92. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 135.
93. Both of these episodes—the removal debate and the bank debate—serve as a useful
reminder that there was not a fixed set of legal rules employed by the founding generation to
ascertain the meaning of the Constitution. The notion of invoking a fixed set of original
methods to interpret the Constitution ignores the level of contestation over interpretive
questions in the founding era. This erroneous assumption mars the approach of so-called
“original methods originalism.” See generally John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Unifying Original Intent and Original Public Meaning, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1371 (2019).
94. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519,
525–29 (2003).
95. Thus, philosopher Paul Grice, the figure most often cited by public meaning
originalists, argued that it is speaker intentions that determine meaning. See Lawrence B.
Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 489–92
(2013). Scott Soames offers a more convincing Gricean account of constitutional meaning.
See generally Scott Soames, Deferentialism:
A Post-originalist Theory of Legal
Interpretation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 597 (2013) (discussing determining original
constitutional meaning in a Gricean tradition). For a critique of Lawrence Solum’s use of
Grice, suggesting that the philosopher’s theory ought to lead to an intentionalist, not a public
meaning approach, see Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in
Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 703–04 (2009). For other
philosophical critiques of the relevance of Grice’s conversational model, see generally Mark
Greenberg, Legislation as Communication?: Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic
Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217, 233–41
(Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011); Mark Greenberg, Natural Law Colloquium:
Legal Interpretation and Natural Law, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 109, 122 (2020); Andrei Marmor,
The Pragmatics of Legal Language, 21 RATIO JURIS 423, 435 (2008).
96. The problem with adopting a Gricean approach, even the more sophisticated version
advanced by Soames, derives from the assumption that constitutional discourse is simply a
form of ordinary day-to-day communication among social equals who share common
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constitutional communication in the founding era were shaped by the
rhetorical and ideological rules of eighteenth-century Anglo-American
debate, not the ordinary conversation rules that modern philosophers have
taken as normative in simple, direct communication.97 Indeed, if one studies
actual patterns of reading to make sense of the way the Constitution was
interpreted in 1788—focusing on real eighteenth-century constitutional
communication, not some fictional version conjured up by modern
originalists—it is clear that founding-era readers were far more sophisticated
in decoding texts and were especially mindful of political agendas and
rhetorical excesses. Communication was not always honest, seldom concise,
hardly ever maximally informative, and rarely clear. To deal with these
realities, founding-era readers approached constitutional writings with a
good deal of suspicion and filtered them through an ideological lens that
reflected the political fears, aspirations, and experiences of different readers
and actors. Thus, when compared to founding-era Americans, modern
originalist modes of reading seem extremely simplistic and naïve.98
One of the many ironies unnoticed by modern originalists arises from
Madison’s theory of ratifier intent. According to the standard philosophyof-language communication model, in ordinary conversation, speakers’
meaning is typically dispositive.99 Yet, Madison’s theory of ratifier intent
focuses not on speakers’ meaning but on a very specific group of listeners—
the participants in state ratification conventions.100 This simple fact alone
background assumptions and interpretive conventions. Constitutional communication, at least
from the founding era, simply does not fit this model. Moreover, Grice’s model assumes that
one can clearly identify the relevant participants in the original conversation and, once
identified, it assumes all participants were part of a single speech community. All of these
assumptions are historically inaccurate. Founding-era America was a period of revolutionary
ferment and deep division and is better characterized as a series of overlapping or nested
speech communities, not a single homogenous speech community. See generally
MARCYLIENA H. MORGAN, SPEECH COMMUNITIES (2014). Grice’s model has been heavily
criticized by linguistic anthropologists and sociolinguists for its ethnocentric assumptions—it
assumes that all forms of communication resemble philosophy seminars at Oxford or other
elite academic institutions. See Jane H. Hill, Book Review, 45 LANGUAGE IN SOC’Y 609, 609
(2016) (reviewing ALESSANDRO DURANTI, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF INTENTIONS: LANGUAGE
IN A WORLD OF OTHERS (2015)). See generally, ALESSANDRO DURANTI, THE ANTHROPOLOGY
OF INTENTIONS: LANGUAGE IN A WORLD OF OTHERS (2015).
97. Cornell, supra note 6, at 827.
98. Contrary to the claims of modern originalists, there is very little commonality between
the communicative situation speakers or readers faced in 1788 or 1791 and the standard model
of communication that most philosophers of language take as a given. For criticism of the
standard communication model’s applicability to founding-era approaches to reading
constitutional texts, see generally Cornell, supra note 6.
99. On the standard conversational model and Grice, see Soames, supra note 95.
100. Originalists might point out that ratifiers would simply reflect the dominant
assumptions of the broader reading population. The truth of this claim is itself an empirical
question that requires an ethnography of founding-era reading practices. See Cornell, supra
note 6. In the case of Second Amendment originalism, Justice Antonin Scalia rejected the
patterns of linguistic usage of the First Congress, then wrote in favor of a selective use of
dictionary-based semantic parsing of the text, so originalists have not been very consistent in
applying this view of ordinary meaning. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, District of
Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923 (2009) (describing Scalia’s
originalism in approving terms).
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renders the comparison to ordinary face-to-face acts of communication
dubious. Similarly, attempting to analogize interpreting the Constitution to
activities such as reading recipes or grocery lists is just silly.101 We do not
typically turn over our recipe or grocery list in a supermarket and ask a group
of strangers what they think a recipe list containing the term “nice cut of stew
meat” ought to mean.102 Indeed, one might find very different answers if this
question is asked in a kosher butcher shop versus an Italian one.
Indeed, the irony of comparing constitutional communication to a recipe
is compounded if one is familiar with the vast corpus of founding-era
writings produced during ratification. The idea of treating such texts like
recipes was used as a joke by Federalists to mock anti-Federalists.103
Obviously, modern originalists have not gotten the punch line of that joke.
Humor, of course, has always been a serious matter, as any comedian or
linguistic anthropologist could tell you.104 To understand a joke, one must
attain a level of fluency in a language, something few originalists have
managed. Sadly, most originalists still do not get the joke.105
It is also important to recognize that Madison’s early attempt to formulate
a coherent theory of constitutional interpretation in the 1790s was provisional
at best, a preliminary effort that was subject to revision. Indeed, it is worth
recalling that no theory of constitutional interpretation advanced by anyone
in the founding era, including Madison’s, was ever officially sanctioned.106
Although the Constitution was ratified by a legal process, the legal methods
used to interpret it were contested throughout this period and no consensus
ever emerged. None of the methods, including Madison’s, has the force of
law.107 Madison’s theory represented his best attempt at a particular
constitutional moment to articulate one plausible model of constitutional
interpretation that was consistent with his larger commitment to his theory of
popular sovereignty.108 Although some modern interpreters may find
101. See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823,
1833–36 (1997). For a devastating critique of the recipe analogy, see Michael Dorf, Recipe
for Trouble: Some Thoughts on Meaning, Translation and Normative Theory, 85 GEO. L.J.
1857, 1859–62 (1997).
102. See generally Lawson, supra note 101.
103. See A Receipt for an Antifederalist Essay, PA. GAZETTE, Nov. 14, 1787.
104. See generally NOËL CARROLL, HUMOR: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2014);
Salvatore Attardo, Semantics and Pragmatics of Humor, 2 LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS
COMPASS 1203 (2008).
105. For another example of originalists’ reliance on a simplistic model of communication
that views constitutional interpretation as something akin to reading a recipe, see ILAN
WURMAN, A DEBT AGAINST THE LIVING: AN INTRODUCTION TO ORIGINALISM 5, 31–35 (2017).
Wurman’s metaphor assumes that there is a single universal approach to writing and reading
recipes that applies to all cultures, in all places, and at all times. See id. For a useful corrective
to such a naïve and ethnocentric assumption, see HENRY NOTEAKER, A HISTORY OF
COOKBOOKS: FROM KITCHEN TO PAGE OVER SEVEN CENTURIES 52–54 (2017).
106. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 135.
107. The failure to appreciate these undeniable historical facts about founding-era law mars
the approach of original methods originalism and original law originalism. On original
methods originalism, see supra note 93. On original law originalism, see William Baude &
Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1455 (2019).
108. Baude & Sachs, supra note 107, at 1455.
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Madison’s theory normatively appealing, it is not hardwired into our
constitutional jurisprudence any more than the rival theories that Elbridge
Gerry or others proffered in the First Congress. Indeed, none of the theories
floated by different actors during the founding period can claim any special
status in this regard.109
Finally, making sense of Madison’s evolving ideas about the problem of
constitutional meaning requires grappling with his views of the
indeterminacies of language and his recognition that politics would
invariably trump legal interpretation in almost every instance.110 Mere
parchment barriers, even when buttressed with a theory of constitutional
interpretation, would never be a match for the will of the people or the
machinations of the politically powerful organized as a faction.111 This
recognition did not lead Madison to despair, but it should temper modern
efforts to elevate Madison’s theory above contemporary rivals. For Madison
and many others within the founding generation, it was politics all the way
down.
Madison had little faith in recourse to abstract arguments about the
Constitution’s text as a method to resolve controversial legal issues. Instead,
constitutional meaning would be worked on a case-by-case basis, by actors
Madison called this process
engaged in constitutional politics.112
constitutional “liquidation.”113 In a letter to Virginia jurist Spencer Roane,
Madison observed that it “was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that
difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in
expounding terms & phrases necessarily used in such a Charter,” particularly,
the language of federalism that “divide[d] legislation between the General
and the local Governments.”114 Accordingly, “it might require a regular
course of practice to liquidate” the language.115 The issue of the bank’s
constitutionality offered the clearest example of “liquidation.”116 Nearly two
decades of politics and practice had transformed the bank’s role in American
life. Agents of the federal government had done official business with the
bank, implying a kind of tacit constitutional recognition.117 The bank had
also gained a measure of popular approval, evidenced in its growth and

109. While some decisions of the Marshall Court established strong precedents, the actions
of the Taney Court, which rejected many of these Federalist legal ideas, caution against
treating these decisions as establishing fixed interpretive principles. See LEONARD &
CORNELL, supra note 10.
110. Id. at 135–36.
111. Id. at 135.
112. Id. at 135–36.
113. Id. at 136.
114. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 447, 450 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908).
115. Id. Of course, 1819 was another tumultuous moment in American constitutional
history, a fact that ought to shape how one interprets this letter.
116. See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21–29 (2019);
Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Madisonian Liquidation, and the
Originalism Debate, 106 VA. L. REV. 1, 53 (2020); Nelson, supra note 94, at 525–53.
117. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 136.
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prosperity. Moreover, the failure of efforts to defund or abolish it only
underscored its broad acceptance.118
Lastly, the bank, as a party to a number of proceedings, had been
recognized by the courts.119 All three branches of government, and the
people themselves, had by their actions conferred legitimacy on the bank,
which was now an accomplished legal fact. Madison accounted for all these
factors in 1811 as he devised his position on the constitutional legitimacy of
the bank.120 Constitutional meaning had emerged from the dynamic world
of constitutional politics.121
Nonetheless, Madison’s position over the bank recharter shocked many
Republicans who deemed it a betrayal of strict construction and a repudiation
of states’ rights principles: two of the core beliefs that had undergirded their
opposition to the Federalists since the 1790s.122 One of the most vociferous
critics in the press, writing under the pen name “Tammany,” derided
Madison’s theory of the Constitution as “chameleon-like.”123 Tammany
wondered if the Constitution’s meaning “changes its hue according to the
times and positions in which it may viewed.”124
Madison concluded that his answer was yes. This was the opposite view
of Old Republicans, who clung to an anti-Federalist conception of
constitutionalism.
Writing for the Richmond Enquirer, Harmodius
“challenged the idea that the Constitution might evolve by means of judicial
precedents.”125 In other words, Old Republicans saw Madison’s theory of
liquidation as constitutional heresy. Rather than conform to the “changing
and uncertain light of precedent,” elected officials, including judges,
representatives, and even presidents, ought to be bound by the unchanging
“words and spirit of the Constitution.”126 For Tammany and Harmodius, the
meaning of the Constitution’s text had been fixed at the time of enactment
and ought to constrain subsequent interpreters.127 Ironically, modern
originalists are the heirs of Tammany and Harmodius, not Madison.
Originalists’ commitment to the ideas of fixation and constraint are closer in
spirit to the Old Republican critics and their anti-Federalist views of
constitutional interpretation than they are to the ideas championed by
Madison or the Marshall Court.128

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Harmodius, To the Virginia Legislature, RICH. ENQUIRER, Dec. 13, 1810.
LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 137.
On the Marshall court, see id. at 84–115.
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Madison had never had much faith that language, particularly
constitutional texts, could ever effectively fix meaning.129 He made his
concerns explicit in Federalist No. 37:
[T]he medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each
other adds a fresh embarrassment. The use of words is to express ideas.
Perspicuity therefore requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly
formed, but that they should be expressed by words distinctively and
exclusively appropriated to them. But no language is so copious as to
supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to
include many, equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence it must happen,
that however accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and
however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition of
them may be rendered inaccurate, by the inaccuracy of the terms in which
it is delivered. And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less,
according to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined. When the
Almighty Himself condescends to address mankind in their own language,
His meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful, by the
cloudy medium through which it is communicated.130

Madison’s pessimistic view of the limits of language was not shared by
many anti-Federalists, particularly those who viewed written texts through a
lens provided by popular Bible-based modes of reading, which were strongly
textualist.131 Rather than approach language from the perspective of John
Locke or enlightenment theory, these popular radicals were far more likely
to approach language from a set of assumptions about meaning derived from
the more egalitarian strains of evangelical Protestantism.132 At its most
extreme, anti-Federalism inclined toward a form of constitutional literalism,
demanding that legal texts be written clearly in simple, precise language.133
Originalists are fond of quoting Madison’s letter to Henry Lee to support
their claim that Madison was a modern-style originalist when it came to
interpreting the Constitution. It is worth taking a closer look at Madison’s
argument in that letter. After disparaging the baneful influence of party on
American politics and constitutional debate, Madison wrote:
I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in which the
Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation. In that sense alone it
is the legitimate Constitution. And if that be not the guide in expounding
it, there can be no security for a consistent and stable, more than for a
faithful exercise of its powers. If the meaning of the text be sought in the
changeable meaning of the words composing it, it is evident that the shape
and attributes of the Government must partake of the changes to which the
words and phrases of all living languages are constantly subject. What a
metamorphosis would be produced in the code of law if all its ancient
129. See JOHN HOWE, LANGUAGE AND POLITICAL MEANING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA
13–37 (2004); Rakove, supra note 3, at 599.
130. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 69, at 198 (James Madison).
131. On traditions of intensive Bible reading and anti-Federalist constitutional
hermeneutics, see Cornell, supra note 4, at 25.
132. Id. at 24–25.
133. Id. at 25.

1778

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

phraseology were to be taken in its modern sense. And that the language
of our Constitution is already undergoing interpretations unknown to its
founders, will I believe appear to all unbiassed Enquirers into the history
of its origin and adoption.134

The first point worth noting is that Madison’s description of prevailing
practice underscores that a dynamic view of constitutional interpretation had
already taken hold of American constitutional law. Madison was on the
losing side of this battle, so it is unclear what his prescriptions means for
modern legal interpretation.135
Secondly, the text that preceded this passage so beloved by public meaning
originalists suggests a very different understanding of Madison’s views of
constitutional interpretation. Madison was not defending a strong textualist
approach but rather endorsing an approach to constitutional interpretation
that was more holistic. The Constitution, he wrote, ought to be given “that
just construction, which with the aid of time and habit, may put an end to the
more dangerous schisms otherwise growing out of it.”136
Arriving at a just construction of the Constitution had proven to be
anything but simple or straightforward in Madison’s experience.137 The
liquidation of meaning that Madison envisioned was never intended to be a
strongly textualist mode of analysis divorced from the realities of
constitutional politics. Although the meaning of the words may not have
changed, a just construction of them would shift in response to changes in
constitutional politics. Construction, in Madison’s view, provided the
flexible tools necessary to adapt the Constitution to changing times.138
Madison’s view of construction should not be confused with the way
modern originalists use this term.139 Some modern originalists have argued
that the terms “interpretation” and “construction” ought to be used in a highly
technical and totally anachronistic sense, at odds with founding-era usage.
This seems an odd choice for those claiming to seek the original meaning of
134. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 114, at 190, 191 (emphasis added).
135. For good examples of how originalists have misread Madison’s letter by focusing on
a single point and ignoring the rest of the letter, see Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 628 (1999); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Originalism and Supermajoritarianism: Defending the Nexus, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1919
(2007). Barnett notes that Madison’s political actions were not always consistent with an
originalist approach but that we ought to ignore how Madison actually behaved and instead
focus on those threads of his thinking that fit with modern originalism. This approach to
constitutional theory turns reality on its head. It is Madison’s behavior and his immersion in
constitutional politics that shaped American law, not his isolated musings and shifting
theoretical speculations about constitutional theory.
136. Barnett, supra note 135, at 628. During the debate over the removal power of the
president in 1789, Madison talked about “fair” or “proper” construction and “the spirit and
principles, contained in that instrument.” See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 387–90 (1789) (Joseph
Gales ed., 1834).
137. GIENAPP, supra note 4, at 935–36.
138. See supra notes 88–131 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 486 (2013).
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the text. The most vociferous champion of this ahistorical framework is
originalist Lawrence Solum.140 According to Solum, “interpretation” is the
process of establishing the “enriched” linguistic meaning of a legal text.
“Construction,” in his view, is a separate task that ascertains the legal effect
or legal meaning of a text.141 Solum’s model imposes a set of modern
jurisprudential categories on founding-era texts that would have made little
sense to Madison and others. Apart from a few cases, such as the language
describing the age requirements for holding office, there were few parts of
the Constitution’s text that could be understood without engaging in a
process of just or rational construction. Solum’s model erroneously assumes
that the relevant background assumptions and interpretive rules needed to
make sense of the Constitution were fixed in the founding era and were
simply part of the context. In fact, these assumptions and rules were deeply
contested at the time and individual actors had to decide which assumptions
and rules were applicable to the text. Rational and just construction was the
process of choosing which of these assumptions and rules ought to be
employed when making sense of the Constitution. Apart from a few trivial
constitutional questions, there was no constitutional meaning without a
process of construction. Solum and other originalists have foisted their own
ahistorical interpretive framework on founding-era texts and the results have
been a systematic distortion of the meaning of those texts; in some instances
the process of distortion has produced an inversion of reality in which
originalist interpretation yields conclusions almost diametrically opposite of
what the historical reality reveals.142
Rather than turn to Paul Grice, a philosopher whose insights have been
challenged by sociolinguists and linguistic anthropologists who study how

140. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95 (2010).
141. See Solum, supra note 139. Solum has shifted his approach from a largely semantic
one to one in which there is greater focus on “pragmatic enrichment.” Unfortunately, Solum
continues to approach context as fixed and continues to ignore the work of sociolinguistic and
linguistic anthropology. See supra note 96.
142. The systematic distortion of founding-era texts has been most egregious in the case of
the Second Amendment. For a good example, see Solum, supra note 100. Solum makes a
number of ahistorical assumptions and interpretive errors in this article, including misreading
the founding-era rule on preambles. For a corrective to his error, see David Thomas Konig,
Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the Political
Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295 (2009).
Moreover, Solum’s critique of Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent in District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), is inconsistent with his purported, but philosophically distorted,
Gricean model. The discussion of the Second Amendment in the First Congress would, in a
genuinely Gricean model, offer important evidence of how terms such as “bear arms” were
typically understood by founding-era speakers. True Griceans, unlike Solum, would seek to
establish the connections between speakers’ intentions and patterns of usage in Congress and
the society at large. By contrast, Scalia’s Heller opinion’s heavy reliance on dictionaries,
earlier English authors, and later nineteenth-century authors and cases is not consistent with a
genuinely Gricean approach, a fact that Solum seems unaware of in his petulant and
cantankerous essay.
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language functions in complex literate societies,143 a better alternative would
be to adopt a pragmatic-inferentialist model of legal meaning, not the Gricean
semantic-pragmatic one originalists have adopted.144 An inferentialist model
seems far closer to Madison’s theory of just construction than the model of
fixation and constraint, or interpretation and construction, favored by many
modern originalists.145
If early American constitutional debate resembled an academic discussion
around a seminar table, perhaps originalist assumptions might be apt, but the
history of early American constitutional politics shares few features with
discussions around conference tables or polite exchanges in a faculty lounge.
If one looks closely at Madison’s evolving constitutional theory in the period
between the adoption of the Constitution and the end of his presidency, one
would be hard-pressed to claim Madison’s views or actions were shaped by
any of the ideas that define modern originalism. Madison believed that
political actors outside of the courts would play a major role in shaping
constitutional development.146
CONCLUSION
History has always been relevant to American law. Getting that history
right is important if originalism is to become a more serious scholarly
enterprise and move beyond an ideological practice.147 Ironically, modern
originalist theories and interpretive methods are far closer to the antiFederalist losers than the Federalist winners. In this sense, originalism
143. For a critique of Gricean assumptions that contrasts them with the work of empirical
linguistics, particularly sociolinguists and linguistic anthropologists, see generally Elizabeth
Mertz & Jothie Rajah, Language-and-Law Scholarship: An Interdisciplinary Conversation
and a Post-9/11 Example, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 169 (2014).
144. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
145. On the philosophical tenets of inferentialism, see Robert Brandom, Inferentialism and
Some of Its Challenges, 74 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RSCH. 651, 656 (2007). Brandom
distinguishes between two forms of inferentialism: “What may be called ‘weak’ inferentialism
claims only that the inferential connections among sentences are necessary for them to have
the content that they do, in the sense that unless at least some of those inferential involvements
were as they are, the sentence would mean something different.” Id. This theory was
counterposed to another that Brandom dubs hyperinferentialism: “At the other end of the
spectrum is what might be called ‘hyperinferentialism.’ It is the claim that the inferential
connections among sentences, narrowly construed, are sufficient to determine the contents
they express.” Id. Although the latter view remains controversial among philosophers, the
former claim is widely accepted across a variety of fields and is consistent with both the late
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s views of language and the weak-meaning holism most historians
embrace. On historians’ weak-meaning holism, see generally Mark Bevir, Contextualism:
From Modernist Method to Post-analytic Historicism, 3 J. PHIL. HIST. 211 (2009); A. P.
Martinich, A Moderate Logic of the History of Ideas, 73 J. HIST. IDEAS 609 (2012). On the
promise of inferentialism for legal interpretation, see Damiano Canale & Giovanni Tuzet, On
Legal Inferentialism: Toward a Pragmatics of Semantic Content in Legal Interpretation, 20
RATIO JURIS 32 (2007).
146. On Madison’s departmentalism, see generally LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
147. See generally Jamal Greene, A Nonoriginalism for Originalists, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1443
(2016); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006).
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produces a constitutional paradox: applying modern originalist approaches
yields a Constitution that could never have existed in the founding era
because it would have implemented the anti-Federalist vision of the
document.148 Rather than continue to approach the American Constitution
as if it were written by the anti-Federalist losers, it makes far more sense to
start with the historical fact that it was the Federalist winners who actually
wrote the Constitution, shaped the amendment process, and dominated
politics in the first two decades after ratification. Anti-Federalist reservations
and criticism played an important role in shaping Federalist responses during
this time, and these concerns continue to echo in American public discourse
today. There may well be some useful lessons and cautionary warnings to
be gleaned from a close study of anti-Federalism, but it is important to
distinguish between history’s winners and losers.149 Modern originalists
would do well to acknowledge this fact in the next iteration of their theory.

148. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 641, 716 (2013). For examples of other approaches, see Richard H. Fallon Jr., The
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L. REV. 1 (2015).
149. The Federalist victory proved to be short-lived, as Jacksonian constitutionalism swept
away much of the Federalist Constitution. See LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10. Although
anti-Federalist ideas continue to inspire constitutional dissent, it is important to avoid
confusing the two sides in the original debate over the Constitution. On the persistence of
anti-Federalism as a source for a potent dissenting constitutional tradition, see generally
CORNELL, supra note 68.

